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To examine whether the exchange rate regime in place has any impact on inflation performance in 
transition economies, the study develops an empirical framework that addresses some of the main 
problems plaguing empirical work in this strand of the literature. Empirical results demonstrate that 
exchange rate regime does make a difference for inflation performance. The findings indicate that 
transition countries with intermediate arrangements may achieve lower inflation if they were to adopt a 
fixed regime. An interesting empirical finding worth highlighting is that an unanticipated float—a 
situation describing a country where fundamentals suggest that it is likely to adopt another regime, but 
instead adopts a floating regime—results in lower inflation.   
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   1. INTRODUCTION  
The issue of the appropriateness of exchange rate arrangements has returned to the 
forefront as a result of the recent crises in Asia, Russia, Brazil, and more recently economic 
developments in Argentina.  More precisely, the debate over fixed and flexible exchange regimes 
has once again taken center stage.  Some claimed that the first round of this debate was won by 
those advocating flexible regimes: all crisis episodes took place in countries which had adopted a 
variety of mechanisms for pegging more or less closely to the dollar (Calvo 1999b).  Fixed 
exchange rates, soft pegs in particular, were blamed for the recent financial meltdowns 
(Goldstein 1999).  The advocates of fixed exchange regime, however, have asserted that there 
are bad fixes and good fixes: a good fix is, for example, full dollarization (see Calvo, 1999a, 
Hanke and Schuller, 1999).  Clearly, this controversy, which has raged in the economic literature 
for more than a century, continues unabated.  
An important recent development in the debate over the most appropriate exchange rate 
arrangement is the recognition that the choice of the exchange rate regime for developing 
countries is different from that of developed countries (see Calvo 1999b and Calvo and Reinhart 
2000a, 2000b).  Developing countries are often beset by a lack of credibility and limited access 
to international markets; they are beset by more pronounced adverse effects of exchange rate 
volatility on trade, high liability dollarization, and higher passthrough from the exchange rate to 
inflation.  Consequently, benign neglect of the exchange rate is not a feasible option for 
developing countries.  
Admittedly, empirical corroboration of the arguments set forth in the literature has been 
the least explored part of this debate.  Contrary to the large number of theoretical and conceptual 
discussions, relatively few studies have made an attempt to investigate empirically the link 
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 between macroeconomic performance and the exchange rate regime.
1  This is, perhaps, because 
such an empirical investigation is fraught with difficulties, including the problem concerning the 
classification of the exchange regime.   
In spite of the growing interest over the link between the exchange rate regime and 
macroeconomic performance, the burgeoning empirical literature on transition economies has 
paid little attention to this issue.
2  It has largely focused on recovery and growth as well as price 
liberalization and inflation (see Berg et al. 1999, Christoffersen and Doyle 1998, Fischer and 
Sahay 2000, and Havrylyshyn et. al. 1998).    Some of the existing studies made an attempt to 
incorporate only the effect of the adoption of a fixed exchange rate regime on inflation and 
growth with mainly two objectives in mind: (i) to capture favorable confidence effects of 
nominal exchange rate anchors on velocity; and (ii) to account for the output costs of 
stabilization associated with the adoption of a particular nominal anchor, namely the exchange 
rate.  Nevertheless, none of the studies made an attempt to investigate explicitly the links 
between the nominal exchange rate regime and inflation.   
This paper aims to fill this void by investigating empirically the link between the exchange 
rate regime and inflation performance in transition economies.  To this end, we develop an 
empirical framework that addresses some of the main problems plaguing empirical work in this 
strand of the literature, namely the Lucas critique, endogeneity of the exchange rate regime, and 
                                                 
1 Ghosh et. al. (1997) and Baxter and Stockman (1989) are among the most widely quoted empirical studies in this literature. 
Also, a recent paper by Domaç and Soledad Martinez Peria (2003) investigates this topic from a different angle by focusing on 
the link between banking crises and the exchange regime. 
2 Studies by Dornbusch (1994) and by Sachs (1996) are among the few papers focusing on the macroeconomic implications of 
the exchange rate regime and on the choice of the exchange rate in the transition countries. More recently, series of papers— 
presented at an Association for Comparative Economic Studies panel entitled “Exchange Rate Policies in Transition”, in 
Chicago, January 4, 1998—made an attempt to explore issues related to exchange rate regime in the countries in Transition. 
Majority of the papers were descriptive in their nature and made no attempt to empirically investigate the macroeconomic 
implications of the exchange rate regime in transition economies. 
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 the sample selection problem.
3  More specifically, we utilize a switching regression model, 
which is estimated using a two-step Heckman procedure.  First, we estimate the equation for the 
choice of the exchange rate regime by using ordered probit.  Second, we employ a switching 
regression technique to investigate whether the exchange rate regime has a bearing on inflation 
in transition economies.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 takes a cursory look at the 
evolution of key macroeconomic variables in transition economies under different exchange rate 
arrangements. Section 3 describes the empirical framework.  Section 4 reports empirical 
findings.  Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND THE EXCHANGE RATE REGIME: 
STYLIZED FACTS FROM TRANSITION COUNTRIES 
A wide variety of exchange rate regimes has been adopted in transition countries.  Not only 
have the regimes been different, but also in some countries they have changed since the inception 
of the reforms.
4  A summary of some stylized facts from three pairs of countries operating under 
alternative exchange rate regimes 1991-98 is shown in Table 1, which draws on the stated 
commitment of the central bank (as summarized in the IMF’s Annual report on Exchange Rate 
Arrangements and Exchange Rate Restrictions).  In other words, it uses a de jure classification 
based on the publicly stated commitment of the exchange rate instead of a de facto classification 
based on the observed behavior of the exchange rate.   
                                                 
3 The Lucas critique states that when there is a policy switch the coefficients associated with policy variables should change.  
This is because the way in which expectations are formed—the relationship of expectations to past information—changes when 
the behavior of forecasted variables changes.  The sample selection problem arises from the fact that countries do not choose 
their exchange rate regimes randomly.  Instead, their choice hinges on a set of fundamentals, which, in turn, affects 
macroeconomic outcomes such as inflation and growth.  Consequently, the use of standard econometric techniques such as OLS 
or 2SLS will produce biased results stemming from the correlation between the regime choice and the error term in either the 
inflation or growth equation. 
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 Both classifications have their own shortcomings.  A de facto classification has the advantage 
of being based on observable behavior, but it does not capture the distinction between stable 
nominal exchange rates resulting from the absence of shocks, and stability that stems from policy 
actions offsetting shocks.  More importantly, it fails to reflect the commitment of the central 
bank to intervene in the foreign exchange market.  Although the de jure classification captures 
this formal commitment, it falls short of capturing policies inconsistent with the commitment, 
which, in turn, lead to a collapse or frequent adjustments of the parity. 
With these limitations in mind, we—following Ghosh et. al. (1997)—classify exchange 
rate arrangements into three categories: pegged;  intermediate; and floating regimes.
5  T h e  
pegged regimes include single currency pegs, SDR pegs, other published basket pegs, and secret 
baskets.  The intermediate group contains cooperative systems, unclassified floats, and floats 
with pre-determined ranges.  The float group comprises of floats without pre-determined range 
and pure floats. 
The analysis presented in Table 1 shows that countries with intermediate flexibility had 
better growth performance, compared to those that pegged and floated.  In terms of inflation 
performance, countries with pegged exchange rates had the lowest inflation, whereas those with 
floating rates experienced the highest inflation during the period under consideration.  Not 
surprisingly, countries with floating rates had considerably higher monetary growth compared to 
those with fixed or intermediate regimes—an observation confirming the conventional discipline 
argument arising from the impact of fixed regimes on the dynamics of money creation.   
Moreover, countries that pegged or adopted intermediate exchange rate arrangements exhibited 
noticeably better fiscal discipline compared to those that adopted floating rates.  
                                                                                                                                                             
4 See Corker et al (2000) for a more detailed discussion of this issue for selected advanced transition economies. 
5 To this end, we draw on the various issues of the IMF’s Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange Rate Restrictions. 
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 Table 1. Exchange Rate Regime and Macroeconomic Performance: Transition Economies  
  Pegged Intermediate Flexibility Independent Floating
Growth Performance 
Mean -0.40 0.73 -7.81
Median 3.24 2.30 -8.20
Inflation Performance 
Mean 71.02 228.12 933.70
Median 14.05 19.50 116.00
Inflation Performance
a 
Mean 0.20 0.26 0.54
Median 0.12 0.16 0.54
Unemployment Performance 
Mean 8.97 10.61 9.16
Median 9.65 9.05 8.45
Budget Balance
b 
Mean -3.53 -3.55 -9.74
Median -1.90 -3.10 -7.50
Broad Money Growth 
Mean  38.85 111.04 286.79
Median  20.40 29.10 92.15
Broad Money Growth
c 
Mean  0.22 0.27 0.50
Median  0.17 0.23 0.48
Current Account Deficit
b 
Mean -5.21 -4.72 -3.86
Median -5.02 -4.40 -7.70
Reserves to Base Money 
Mean 1.03 1.13 0.73
Median 1.13 0.98 0.60
Source: EBRD, IMF, WB, and authors’ calculations. 
Note: The sample, over the period of 1991-98, consists of Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakstan, Kyrgyz Republic,Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, 
Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine. 
a: To reduce the importance of outliers, the inflation rate (π) is transformed to: π/(1+π).  Clearly, as π→∞, the 
inflation rate will approach to 1. 
b: As a % of GDP 
c: Similar transformation to reduce the importance of outliers for inflation is also performed for broad money 
growth. 
 
Countries with fixed exchange rate regime appear to have higher current account deficits 
compared to those adopting intermediate and flexible regimes.  However, once the outlier 
observation, Azerbaijan (1992), is excluded, countries with flexible exchange rate regimes have 
higher current account deficits than those with fixed and intermediate regimes.  Finally, countries 
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 with fixed and intermediate regimes have higher ratios of reserves to base money than those with 
floating exchange regime. 
These are, of course, simple observations without controlling for many relevant factors.  It 
is, therefore, not possible to conclude how much of the better macroeconomic performance was 
in fact due to the particular exchange rate regime adopted and how much was due instead to 
other important factors.  
 
3. THE EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
It may be possible to underpin some of these stylized facts from a cursory look at the 
evolution of selected key economic indicators under alternative regimes.  However, it is not 
possible to identify the independent effects of the nominal exchange rate regime on economic 
performance without a thorough analysis in which macroeconomic/financial fundamentals and 
institutional arrangements—affecting both economic performance and the choice of the 
exchange rate regime—are controlled for.   
In an attempt to examine the impact of the exchange rate regime on macroeconomic 
performance, empirical studies often employ exchange rate dummies in reduced form equations 
for inflation and growth.  The coefficient estimate of a particular exchange rate regime dummy 
is, in turn, deemed to reveal the effect of the exchange rate arrangement on the dependent 
variable.  One of the major drawbacks of this approach is that at the time of the regime switch 
the coefficients associated with policy variables also change—a phenomenon referred to as the 
Lucas critique.  One approach to avoid this problem is to estimate each equation representing 
different exchange rate regimes separately and then to test for the equality of coefficients.  This 
approach, however, would fail to capture the causal link between macroeconomic fundamentals 
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 and the exchange rate regime—the ability of an economy and also policymakers’ desire to 
implement certain exchange rate regimes under given fundamentals.  
Moreover, existing studies, to the best of our knowledge, fail to address the issue of the 
sample selection problem.  The sample selection problem arises from the fact that countries do 
not choose their exchange rate regimes randomly.  Instead, their choice hinges on a set of 
fundamentals, which, in turn, affects macroeconomic outcomes such as inflation and growth.  
Consequently, the use of standard econometric techniques such as OLS or 2SLS will produce 
biased results stemming from the correlation between the regime choice and the error term in the 
inflation equation.
6 
It should be noted that addressing the sample selection problem will also address the issue 
of the endogeneity of the choice of the exchange rate regime.  This is not achieved by 
instrumenting the dummy variable for the exchange rate regime á la Ghosh (1997).  Instead, it is 
achieved through the assumption of constant covariance between the error term in the structural 
equation and the normally distributed random variable whose realization determines the 
exchange rate regime.   
In an attempt to address the above-mentioned problems plaguing empirical work in this 
literature, we propose an empirical framework, which is based on a switching regression 
technique.  To this end, the investigation employs the following standard formulation of 
switching regression: 
 
Yi = Xi B1+u1i     if   vi < Ziγ+α1,            i=1..I1       (1) 
Yi = Xi B2+u2i      if Ziγ+α1<vi < Ziγ + α2,           i=1..I2       (2) 
Yi = Xi B3+u3i       if   vi >Ziγ + α2,             i=1..I3       (3) 
 
uij is i i d N (0, σj ),while  vi  is i i d N (0, 1 ), cov(uij,vj)=σjv, j=1,2,3 
                                                 
6 To be more precise, this bias arises from the correlation between the error term of the latent variable capturing the regime 
choice and the error of the structural equation. 
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 where (1), (2), and (3) correspond to respective regimes.  The only difference with respect to the 
general formulation of switching regression model is that we employ the same set of regressors 
in each equation in order to be able to test the equality of the coefficients across the regimes.  
The regime is determined by the realization of normally distributed random variable v,  which is 
not observable. We, however, know in which of three areas, given by the inequalities (1)-(3), it is 
realized.  Therefore, α1, α2, and γ can be estimated by ordered probit approach. It should be noted 
that Z should not contain a constant term since α1 and α2 are already in the model. 
Given the following equations: 
 
() ()
() () i v i v
i
i
v i i i h Z h
Z F
Z f
Z v u E 1 1 1 1 1
1
1
1 1 1 σ α γ σ
α γ
α γ
σ α γ − = + − =
+
+
− = + <     (4) 
() ()
() () i v i v
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i
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Z f
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2
2
3 2 1 1
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α γ
α γ
σ α γ = + =
+ −
+
= + >      (5) 
() ( ) ( )
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i i
i i
v i i i i h Z h
Z F Z F
Z f Z f
Z v Z u E 2 2 2 1 2 2
1 2
2 1
2 2 1 1 , , σ α α γ σ
α γ α γ
α γ α γ
σ α γ α γ = =
+ − +
+ − +
= + < < + (6) 
 
where f(.) and F(.) stand for density and cumulative normal distribution functions, respectively. 
 
One can, then, express the equations for corresponding regimes as: 
 
i i v i i e h B X Y 1 1 1 1 + − = σ            ( 7 )  
i i v i i e h B X Y 2 2 2 2 + + = σ            ( 8 )  
i i v i i e h B X Y 3 3 3 3 + + = σ            ( 9 )  
 
where the disturbance term in each equation is of mean zero and heteroscedastic.  The above-
presented model can be estimated in two steps.  In the first step, we estimate α and γ by ordered 
probit approach.  In the second step, we first insert the obtained estimates into the above system  
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 [ (7)-(9)] and then run 2SLS (by instrumenting for endogenous variables) for each regime in the 
system presented below [(10)-(12)]:  
 
i v i i e h B X Y 1 1 1 1 ˆ + − = σ              ( 1 0 )  
i v i i e h B X Y 2 2 2 2 ˆ + + = σ              ( 1 1 )  
i v i i e h B X Y 3 3 3 3 ˆ + + = σ              ( 1 2 )  
 
  Indeed, the above described estimation method amounts to two-step Heckman procedure.  
Once we acquire the rest of the coefficients from the first stage, and correct the variance and 
covariance matrix, we can then test for the relevance of regimes, that is H0: B1=B2=B3, 
σ1v=σ2v=σ3v=0; H1: otherwise. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1 The Determinants of the Choice of Exchange Rate Regime 
Since the studies conducted by Dreyer (1978); Heller (1978) and Holden et al (1981), few 
empirical studies have focused on the choice of exchange rate regime.  More recent studies and 
dramatic events in Asia, Russia and Brazil have rekindled the interest on this topic [Honkapohja 
and Pikkarainen (1994), Edwards (1996), and Rizzo (1998)].  Majority of the studies to date, 
however, did not distinguish developing countries and transition economies and largely 
considered the importance of criteria resulting directly from the theory of optimum currency 
areas. 
  To analyze the determinants of the choice of exchange rate regime in transition countries, 
we employ ordered probit econometric technique.  The econometric model is based on the 
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 assumption that one can order exchange rate regimes in terms of intensities, which seems to be 
plausible in the current context.  The variables that we consider largely draw on the empirical 
specifications employed in previous studies.  More specifically, in our attempt to explain the 
choice of exchange rate regime we utilize variables capturing: progress in structural reforms
7; 
macroeconomic policy; and macroeconomic conditions.  All the variables are lagged to avoid 
simultaneity problems.   
Table 2 reports the results of the ordered probit regression.
8  To conserve space, we 
exclude the variables that are jointly statistically insignificant.
9  In our original estimates, all the 
coefficients, with the exception of the ratio of reserves to monetary base, are significant and have 
the expected signs.  The fact that reserves to monetary base ratio (Res/MB) carries a positive 
coefficient would mean that fixed exchange rate regimes are associated with a lower level of 
Res/MB compared to floating regimes.  Although, at first blush, this finding appears to be 
counterintuitive, it raises the possibility of a non-linear relationship between choice of exchange 
rate regime and the ratio of reserves to monetary base.






                                                 
7  We draw on indicators constructed by De Melo, Denizer, and Gelb (1997) in the following areas: (i) internal markets 
(liberalization of domestic prices and abolition of state trading monopolies); (ii) external markets ( currency convertibility and 
liberalization of the foreign trade regime, including elimination of export controls and taxes as well as substitution of low to 
moderate import duties for import quotas and high import tariffs); and (iii) private sector entry (privatization of small-scale and 
large-scale enterprises and banking reform). 
8 See Appendix C for a detailed description of data. 
9 Among the variables that we included but found to be jointly insignificant are: lags of inflation, external debt, GDP growth, and 
German as well as American interest rates (to capture the importance of the external conditions). 
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 Table 2. Results of Ordered Probit Regressions for the Choice of the Exchange Rate Regime
a 
A. Results of the Original Probit Regression 
 Coefficient Std.  Deviation z-statistics  Probability
Res./MB 0.790 0.255 3.093  [.002]
Budget Balance  -0.084 0.030 -2.840  [.005]
External Markets  4.149 1.407 2.950  [.003]
Private sector entry  -5.707 1.063 -5.370  [.000]
Internal Markets  -7.381 1.743 -4.236  [.000]
Openness -2.199 0.496 -4.434  [.000]
  
 α1 -7.872 1.187 -6.632  [.000]
 α 2 -5.573 1.044 -5.335  [.000]
   
Scaled R
2=0.64  
Number of observations =113   
        
B. Results of the Revised Probit Regression  
 Coefficient Std.  Deviation z-statistics  Probability
Dummy for Res/MB
b 1.309 0.352 3.717  [.000]
Budget Balance  -0.074 0.028 -2.623  [.009]
External Markets  3.656 1.408 2.597  [.009]
Private Sector Entry  -5.363 1.027 -5.223  [.000]
Internal Markets  -6.787 1.684 -4.031  [.000]
Openness -2.097 0.489 -4.292  [.000]
  
 α1 -8.105 1.177 -6.887  [.000]
 α 2 -5.768 1.037 -5.560  [.000]
   
Scaled R
2= 0.66   
Number of observations = 113   
a: Positive sign means that the flexible regime is more likely and the fixed regime is less 
b: Variable takes value 1 if reserve to monetary Base ratio is greater than 1.34 
 
In order to address the possibility of non-linearity between Res/MB and the choice of the 
exchange rate regime, we, first, included a squared term of this variable in the above estimated 
ordered probit regression.  The square term, however, turned out to be insignificant.  Next, we 
explored the possibility of a kinked relationship by breaking the variable into three intervals.  We 
considered a continuous relationship in which each interval has its own slope.  To determine the 
                                                                                                                                                             
10  This non-linearity may arise because a country with a low level of reserves is likely to be in favor of more flexible 
arrangements. When a country has high reserves, however, the increase in credibility associated with fixing the exchange rate 
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 points of the kink, we ran a grid search.  The result was quite surprising: for values smaller than 
1.35 and higher than 1.40, the slope turns out to be insignificant.  However, between these values 
the slope is not only large and positive, but also statistically significant. 
Since the results suggest that the slope is statistically significant only in the middle portion 
of the kinked line—indeed a very small interval—one can infer that there is a threshold above 
which countries tend to avoid fixed regimes.  This, in turn, provides a rationale to use a dummy 
variable to capture this threshold.  To this end, we use a grid-search again. The results of the 
grid-search indicate that the best fit is found for the dummy which takes value of one whenever 
reserve to monetary base ratio exceeds 1.34 and zero otherwise.
11   
The results of the new probit regression, which considers the above-mentioned non-
linearity between Res/MB and the choice of the exchange rate regime, are also presented in 
Table 2.  As expected, more open economies and countries with lower budget deficits tend to 
accept more stringent exchange rate regimes.  Countries that made more progress in the areas of 
internal markets and private sector entry are also more likely to opt for more stringent exchange 
rate arrangements. Countries that achieved more progress in openness to external markets, on the 
other hand, tend to adopt more flexible arrangements.  Moreover, positive and significant 
coefficient associated with the dummy for Res/MB confirms that countries with Res/MB above 
certain threshold, 1.34, tend to adopt more flexible arrangements.  
  All in all, the empirical findings suggest that transition economies tend to adopt more 
stringent exchange rate regimes when they: (i) have lower budget deficits; (ii) have a higher ratio 
of exports plus imports to GDP; and (iii) are more advanced in the areas of private sector entry 
                                                                                                                                                             
would be marginal.  As a result, the country would be more likely to opt for more flexible arrangements. 
11 It should be noted that use of the dummy instead of actual values of the variable is justified by zero slopes outside the small 
interval. 
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 and internal markets.  While the results suggest that those with more progress in external markets 
and with Res/MB above 1.34 opt for more flexible exchange rate arrangements. 
 
4.2 The Exchange Rate Regime and the Inflation Performance 
  A quick glance at the literature on exchange rate regimes and inflation suggests that fixed 
exchange rate regimes—in the presence of consistent macro policies—tend to deliver lower and 
more stable rates of inflation.  These studies offer two explanations.  Fixed rates provide a visible 
commitment, thereby raising the political costs of excessive monetary growth.  A credible peg is 
likely to engender a more robust demand for money, which, in turn, reduces the inflationary 
consequences of a given monetary expansion (Ghosh et. al. 1997).
12 
As was explained in Section 3, however, the existing work in this literature fails to address 
the Lucas critique, endogeneity of the exchange rate regime, and the sample selection problem.   
Prior to proceeding with our empirical approach, which attempts to deal with these problems 
encountered in empirical work, we estimate a reduced form equation for inflation using a similar 
methodology employed by Ghosh et. al. (1997) for comparison purposes.  Specifically, we use  
two-stage least squares (2SLS) in the estimation of the inflation equation, which includes 
reserves to monetary base ratio,
13 the budget balance (measured as a percent of GDP), GDP 
growth, broad money growth, and dummies for the exchange rate regimes.
14   
The results are reported in Table 3.  The findings suggest that increases in Res/MB ratio 
and GDP growth lower inflation, while increases in broad money growth have a positive impact 
on inflation.  Although the exchange rate dummies turn out to be statistically significant, the 
                                                 
12 Studies by Quirk (1994), and Tornell and Velasco (2000), however, dispute this conjecture. 
13 Reserves to monetary base ratio and budget balance reflect the credibility of monetary policy, which, in turn, affects inflation 
expectations. 
14 A more detailed discussion regarding the instruments employed in the estimation will be provided later in this section. 
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 result of the Wald test (chi-square statistics of 3.946 with tail probability 0.14) suggests that the 
null hypothesis that dummies are equal cannot be rejected.
15  As indicated previously, the 
dummy variable approach does not control for sample selection bias and assumes identical 
slopes for all regimes. This, in turn, may create a substantial bias in the results. 
 
Table 3. The Exchange Rate Regime and the Inflation Performance (2SLS) 
  Coefficient Std. Deviation t-statistic 
Dummy for fix  0.093 0.042 2.200 
Dummy for intermediate  0.152 0.044 3.432 
Dummy for float  0.123 0.052 2.365 
Lagged Res/MB  -0.104 0.023 -4.621 
Budget Balance  0.002 0.004 0.439 
GDP growth  -0.012 0.002 -5.804 
Broad money growth  0.666 0.075 8.901 
Dummy for Central Europe  0.056 0.022 2.518 
Dummy for Baltic Countries  0.079 0.047 1.684 
   
Number of observations=113   
 
Next, we estimate the second stage regression for inflation equation, which includes, in 
addition to the variables listed previously, the generalized residuals of the ordered probit 
regression—the covariance term—using switching regression technique described in Section 3.
16  
In essence, this regression is a second stage of Heckman’s two-step procedure to estimate 
switching regression (the first step was the ordered probit). 
Ideally, we would like to run fixed effects as the fixed effects dummies would capture 
initial conditions pertaining to inflation.  Unfortunately, limited degrees of freedom for fixed 
regimes prevent us from employing fixed effects.  As a result, we group the countries involved 
into three categories and create three dummy variables: former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe 
                                                 
15 The exchange rate dummy for the fixed regime is lower than the others, though not statistically significant from them. 
16 We, in the second step, have also tried maximum likelihood estimation in lieu of 2SLS, but failed to achieve convergence. 
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 and Baltic countries. Since we use a constant term in each regime the regression contains only 
two of the dummies.   
Prior to presenting the empirical results, several comments are in order.  In the estimation, 
we instrument GDP growth, budget balance and broad money growth for potential 
endogeneity.
17  In this respect, endogeneity of money growth deserves a special consideration. 
Clearly, this variable cannot be considered as a policy variable under fixed and intermediate 
regimes since it is endogeneously determined.  However, a series of recent papers demonstrated 
that countries that claim they allow their exchange rate to float mostly do not—a phenomenon 
referred to as “fear of floating” (see Calvo and Reinhart 2000a, 2000b).  To clarify this, we 
employ a Hausman test to determine whether broad money growth is endogenous under flexible 
regime.  The result of this test—chi-square statistics of 19 with 0.006 tail probability—suggests 
that this variable is endogeneous under float as well.
18   
Table 4 reports the results of switching regression estimates.  In our attempt to study 
whether the exchange rate regime matters for inflation performance, we, first, test joint 
hypothesis that all coefficients are equal across the regimes, and the estimated covariances are all 
equal to zero (that is in our notation: H0: B1=B2=B3, σ1v=σ2v=σ3v=0).  The result of the Wald 
test statistics, which is equal to 30 with tail probability 0.003, suggests that exchange rate regime 
does make a difference for inflation performance.  Moreover, we also conduct two additional 
tests, namely the equality of coefficients associated with the budget balance and money growth 
                                                 
17 The instrument list for the budget balance includes lagged budget balance, lagged inflation, external debt to GDP ratio, and 
lagged GDP growth. For broad money growth, it includes lagged money growth, lagged inflation, lagged budget deficit, and 
lagged GDP growth.  For GDP growth, it includes lag liberalization index, lag of change in liberalization index, lagged budget 
deficit, lagged GDP growth, lagged inflation, initial condition, and the covariance term. The inclusion of the switching term into 
the GDP growth instrument list is justified by the presence of it in the structural equation for GDP growth. 
18One of the implications of this test might be that the countries announcing floating regime also intervene in the exchange 
market, which makes it dirty float along the lines of the arguments put forth by Calvo and Reinhart (2000a, 2000b).  However the 
above-presented evidence is not sufficient for making such a strong statement. There could be other factors making money 
growth endogeneous. For instance, interactions between inflation and money growth—in the presence of sticky prices a 
government would avoid cutting rate of expansion of money supply to prevent high interest rates and consequent recession.  
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 across the regimes.  The results suggest that the null hypothesis of the equality of the coefficients 
associated with the budget balance cannot be rejected at 5 percent significance level (chi-square 
statistics of 4.6 with tail probability 0.10), while the null of the equality of the coefficients 
associated with broad money growth is rejected (chi-square statistics of 17.9 with tail probability 
0.006). 
 
Table 4. Results of the Switching Regression Estimates : Inflation Equation 
  Coefficient Std. Deviation  t-statistic
Fixed Exchange rate Regime 
    
 Constant  -0.004 0.081  -0.052
 Lagged Res/MB  -0.005 0.050  -0.099
 Budget Balance  -0.010 0.005  -2.161
 GDP growth  -0.008 0.004  -2.194
 Broad money growth  0.336 0.140  2.399
 Covariance  0.010 0.023  0.422
 
Intermediate Exchange rate Regime 
     
  Constant -0.037 0.074  -0.497
 Lagged Res/MB  -0.078 0.034  -2.274
 Budget Balance  -0.012 0.008  -1.587
 GDP growth  0.006 0.004  1.465
 Broad money growth  0.986 0.110  8.924
 Covariance  -0.003 0.037  -0.092
 
Floating Exchange rate Regime 
     
  Constant 0.434 0.137  3.164
 Lagged Res/MB  -0.152 0.070  -2.164
 Budget Balance  0.008 0.008  1.021
 GDP growth  -0.016 0.003  -5.112
 Broad money growth  0.304 0.173  1.756
 Covariance  -0.159 0.069  -2.304
  
 Dummy for Central Europe  0.047 0.045 1.046
 Dummy for Baltic Countries  0.105 0.058 1.807
        
Number of observations =113 
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 The covariance term appears to be significant only under flexible regime.
19  I t  h a s  a  
negative and statistically significant coefficient. This finding suggests that the more 
unanticipated the floating regime on the basis of fundamentals considered in our ordered probit 
regression, the lower the inflation.  Put differently, an unanticipated float—a country that with 
its fundamentals would be likely to adopt another regime, but it adopts floating regime—results 
in lower inflation. 
The empirical findings also confirm that money growth has a positive and statistically 
significant impact on inflation under all regimes.  It is interesting to note that the effect of money 
growth on inflation is the largest under the intermediate regime.
20  This finding, however, should 
not be interpreted as money growth causing higher inflation under intermediate regime compared 
to fixed and floating regimes.  It might be arising from the fact that larger part of the impact of 
money growth on inflation under fixed and floating regimes is captured by other variables.   
Indeed, a glance at the correlation matrix of variables involved indicates that broad money 
growth is more correlated with budget deficit and GDP growth under fixed regime, while it is 
more correlated with GDP growth and Res/MB under floating compared to intermediate regime. 
The results suggest that economic growth has a negative and statistically significant impact 
on inflation under floating and fixed regimes.  While the budget balance appears to be significant 
only under a fixed regime. The negative sign associated with the budget balance is likely to 
reflect two channels: credibility (inflation rises under imperfect credibility) and Keynesian 
(expansionary fiscal policy increases inflation). 
The empirical findings also indicate that, contrary to intermediate and floating regimes, 
reserves to monetary base ratio—a variable that captures the credibility of the monetary 
                                                 
19 This finding also suggests that there is no sample selection problem under fixed and intermediate regimes. 
20 It should be noted that the reported coefficients are partial derivatives and should be interpreted accordingly. 
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 authorities in defending the exchange rate—does not play any role under a fixed regimes.  This 
finding could be attributed to several factors.  First, it is possible that countries with fixed 
exchange rate regime use other mechanisms to enhance credibility.  Second, it is also possible 
that countries with fixed exchange rate regimes usually have a sufficiently high level of reserves 
and variation in reserves does not affect the credibility of the regime and thus inflation.   
Furthermore, the finding that reserves to monetary base ratio is negative and significant 
under both intermediate and floating regimes could be explained by the phenomenon referred to 
as fear of floating arising from lack of credibility.  More specifically, it is argued that developing 
countries are often plagued by a lack of credibility and limited access to international markets, 
more pronounced adverse effects of exchange rate volatility on trade, high liability dollarization, 
and higher passthrough from exchange rate to inflation—all of which cause the authorities to 
resist large movements in the exchange rate (see Calvo and Reinhart 2000a, 2000b).  As a result, 
the reserves to monetary base ratio reflects the authorities’ ability to smooth large fluctuations in 
the exchange rate even under floating and intermediate regimes and, in turn, will be deemed as 
an important sign of credibility by agents. 
As a robustness test, we make an attempt to test the sensitivity of our findings with respect 
to survival bias by excluding the switch year from one exchange rate regime to another.
21  Our 
previous results concerning the joint hypothesis that all coefficients are equal across the regimes 
and the estimated covariances are all equal to zero remain intact (23.5 with tail probability 
0.036).  Moreover, the coefficient estimates in the inflation equation, including the covariance 
term, do not change significantly except for the budget deficit under fixed regime whose 
significance declines.   
                                                 
21 Due to degrees of freedom limitations, we cannot exclude three observations (that is one year before and after the regime 
change) á la Ghosh (1997). 
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 4.3 Simulation Results 
In an attempt to determine whether a particular exchange rate regime would have delivered 
lower (or higher) inflation compared to the one already adopted, we perform simulation exercises 
(see Appendix B).  Although this approach has limitations, it relies on a much less restrictive 




Table 5.  Inflation Simulations 
Mean Median 
If float were running Intermediate    
Fitted inflation (float)    0.32 0.31 
Simulated inflation (intermediate)  0.37 0.36 
   
If Intermediate were running float   
Fitted inflation (intermediate)  0.21 0.20 
Simulated inflation (float)  0.33 0.28 
   
If Intermediate were running Fix   
Fitted inflation (intermediate)  0.21 0.20 
Simulated inflation (fix)  0.13 0.10 
   
If Fix were running Intermediate   
Fitted inflation (fix)  0.13 0.10 
Simulated inflation (intermediate)  0.19 0.19 
 
  Based on the simulation results, the following observations emerge: (i) if a country with a 
floating regime were to move an intermediate regime, it would have higher inflation; (ii) if a 
country with an intermediate regime adopted floating regime, it would experience higher 
inflation; (iii) if a country with an intermediate regime were to run a fixed regime, the country 
                                                 
22
 In particular, this exercise is conducted by using the realized values of variables involved under one regime to determine how 
the country in question would have performed under another exchange rate arrangement.  In other words, it is assumed that 
countries that are simulated to adopt another regime follow the same policies as before.  Obviously, this shortcoming would be 
much more pronounced under simulation exercises involving the two extreme cases:  fixed and floating regimes. Consequently, 
we do not perform the simulation exercises involving fixed and floating regimes. 
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 would experience lower inflation; (iv) if a country with a fixed regime were to adopt an 
intermediate regime, it would experience higher inflation. 
  The results imply that countries with intermediate arrangements may achieve lower 
inflation if they were to adopt a fixed regime.  The findings also suggest that switching from a 
floating regime to an intermediate arrangement may not deliver lower inflation since existing 




The debate over the most appropriate exchange rate arrangement has been one of the most 
controversial topics in the literature.  Economists have debated this issue for a century without 
reaching any firm conclusions.  In spite of its increasing policy relevance, the literature offers 
relatively few empirical studies and those that do exist focus mainly on developed or developing 
countries, without providing any evidence on transition countries.  In this respect, we attempt to 
make two contributions.  First, we develop an empirical framework to address some of the main 
problems plaguing empirical work in this strand of the literature, namely the Lucas Critique, 
endogeneity of the exchange rate regime, and the sample selection problem.  To this end, we 
employ a switching regression model, which is estimated using a two-step Heckman procedure. 
More specifically, we, first, estimate the equation for the choice of the exchange rate regime by 
using ordered probit and then utilize a switching regression technique to investigate whether the 
exchange rate regime affects inflation.  
Second, we use this framework to study whether the exchange rate regime affects inflation 
performance in transition countries—an issue that has not been subject to a thorough empirical 
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 investigation to date.  In this endeavor, we recognize the limitations of our empirical findings 
that arise from the inclusion of a relatively small number of countries (22 countries) and a time 
period of less than 10 years.  Another limitation arises from the use of only the de jure exchange 
rate classification, which is based on the publicly stated commitment of the exchange rate.
23   
With these caveats in mind, the principal conclusions that emerge from our study are: 
1.  Transition economies that: (i) have lower budget deficits; (ii) are more open (i.e. have a 
higher ratio of exports plus imports to GDP); and (iii) have made more progress in private 
sector entry and internal markets tend to adopt more stringent exchange rate regimes.  The 
results also suggest that those countries which have made more progress in opening to 
external markets and with a reserves to monetary base ratio above 1.34 opt for more flexible 
exchange rate arrangements. 
2.  The exchange rate regime does make a difference for inflation performance.  The findings 
imply that countries with intermediate arrangements may achieve lower inflation if they were 
to adopt a fixed regime.  The results also suggest that switching from a floating regime to an 
intermediate arrangement may not deliver lower inflation since their fundamentals may be 
inappropriate for an intermediate regime.  However, when a country with an intermediate 
regime switches to a floating regime, it experiences higher inflation. 
3.  The results also suggest that the case of an unanticipated float—a situation describing a 
country where fundamentals render it likely to adopt another regime, but it ends up adopting 
a floating regime—results in lower inflation.  
                                                 
23 Although a recent promising study by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2000) constructed a de facto classification of the 
exchange rate regimes for the period of 1990-98, the use of their classification in our research would be undesirable on two 
grounds. First, the use of their data set would reduce the number of observations significantly and thus would not be comparable 
to our findings based on de jure classification.  Second, their attempt to construct de facto classification of the exchange rate 
regimes overlooks the possibility that countries often utilize interest rates to affect the exchange rate movements—a point 
acknowledged in their paper.  In fact, Calvo and Reinhart (2000a)  provide some evidence confirming this phenomenon. 
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 In light of these findings, can one conclude that a particular exchange rate regime is 
superior to other exchange rate arrangements in delivering better inflation performance in 
transition economies?  As is widely recognized, there is no single exchange rate regime that is 
best for all countries, at all times, in all circumstances.  Nonetheless, our findings suggest that 
fixed regimes, after controlling for other relevant factors affecting inflation, do deliver lower 
inflation.  This finding, in turn, lends support to the argument that the credibility associated with 
fixed regimes helps policy makers achieve lower inflation outcomes.   
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 Appendix A: Extension of the Heckman Procedure for three Regimes 
 
Heckman (1979) derives the correct asymptotic distribution of the estimates in the two-
stage procedure for the case of two regimes.  In the context of our paper, his formulas can be 
applied to the first and the third regimes.  However, for the second regime it needs some 
modification since the probability the regime is calculated on the basis of two constants (limit 
points).  In this Appendix, we, consistent with Heckman’s (1979) notation, modify the 
asymptotic distribution in the two-stage procedure for the second regime. 
 
We, first, derive the estimate for the variance of the disturbance term, u2.  Rewriting (6) in 
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σ ,  2 1 ˆ , ˆ α α and  γˆ are coming from the ordered 
probit regression in the first stage, I2 is the number of observations in the second regime. 
Next, we derive the assymptotic distribution of the estimated parameters. Drawing on 
Heckman (1979), it is given by: 
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In the above expressions Ω is a variance-covariance matrix of the estimated coefficients 
from the first stage regression, namely ( 2 1 ˆ , ˆ α α ,γˆ),  I is the total number of observations. 
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 Appendix B: Simulation Exercise 
 
In the simulation exercise, we place the values of right hand side variables of one regime 
into the structural equation of another. The resulting value would be the expected inflation if the 
country were to run the other regime.  It should be kept in mind that when conducting this kind 
of simulations the term associated with the covariance in the simulated equation should be 
substituted by the corresponding term from the original equation. For instance, if we were to 
simulate intermediate countries to find out how they would perform under fix regime, the 
original equations for fix and intermediate regimes are the following: 
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where observations denoted by the subscript i represent fix regimes, while those with j stand for 
intermediate arrangements.  Now, we substitute the observations corresponding to the 
intermediate regime into the equation for fix and obtain the simulated inflation from the 
following equation: 
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  Note that after covariance, we have a term coming form the original equation for 
intermediate regime.  Substituting only Zj into the “fix” equation would be incorrect.   
  Finally, from the last expression, we obtain the expected values of inflation if a country 
under intermediate regime were to run fix. 
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 Appendix C: Description of Data 
 
Data on GDP growth, inflation, budget deficit are obtained from various EBRD reports. 
Data on international reserves and monetary base were taken from IFS.  Unfortunately, for the 
majority of transition countries financial statistics in the beginning of transition were 
unavailable.  Consequently, those observations could not be included in the regression analysis. 
Liberalization indices are taken from De Melo et al and updated for 1998 from the EBRD report.  
Classification of the exchange rate regimes is obtained from the IMF’s Exchange Rate 
Arrangements and Exchange Rate Restrictions. 
Moreover, observations corresponding to the year 1997 for Bulgaria were excluded on the 
grounds that Bulgaria accepted currency board in the middle of the year while experiencing 
extremely high inflation prior to the month and, as a result, for the entire year. Since this 
particular year, 1997, would be treated as a fixed regime in the annual data, it would become an 
obvious outlier. 
We also excluded years of war and severe regional conflicts involving the following 
countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Macedonia, and Croatia.  In addition, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan were excluded from the sample due to data problems.  
Time period for Czech Republic and Slovak republic was considered after they separated to 
avoid inconsistency in the data. 
The countries and the periods for the regression analysis are the followings: Albania 1993-
98, Armenia 1995-98, Azerbaijan 1995-98, Belarus 1995-98, Bulgaria 1995-98, Croatia 1995-98, 
Czech Republic 1994-97, Estonia 1993-98, Georgia 1994-98, Hungary 1992-98, Kazakhstan 
1994-98, Kyrgyz Republic 1994-98, Latvia 1994-98, Lithuania 1994-98, Macedonia 1996-98, 
Moldova 1993-98, Poland 1992-98, Romania 1992-98, Russia 1995-98, Slovak Republic 1994-
98, Slovenia 1993-98, and Ukraine 1994-98. 
The series employed in the regression analysis contains 24, 54, and 35 observations under 
fixed, intermediate, and floating regimes, respectively. 
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